1. What Does “Power” Mean in Iran?

Politics is fundamentally about power. But in Iran, two competing definitions of power have coexisted — sometimes peacefully, sometimes violently — since the 1979 Revolution.

The first view holds that power resides in titles and institutions. Once you attain a position — Supreme Leader, President, Speaker of Parliament — you hold power. The second view argues that power lies in the ability to actually exercise it. A title without enforceable authority is just a label.

“It’s possible that the title of Supreme Leader, the way power has been exercised in Iran for the past 37 years, may not always be able to exercise that power by virtue of the title alone.”

This is not a hypothetical problem. It is the central tension in Iranian politics today. And it explains why, after 1979, the architects of the Islamic Republic deliberately created multiple power centers — so no single faction could dominate entirely, and the Supreme Leader could manage the balance.

For a deeper primer on how political systems with divided authority work, see this overview of
Iran’s Government by the Council on Foreign Relations.

2. The Islamic Republic: A Structural Contradiction

The very name “Islamic Republic” contains a paradox that has defined Iranian politics for over four decades. When Ayatollah Khomeini declared the Islamic Republic after the 1979 Revolution, he was weaving together two fundamentally different sources of legitimacy.

What “Islamic” Means in Practice

The “Islamic” component asserts that power derives from Allah and Islamic principles. God is the true center of power. Laws must conform to the Islamic jurist’s interpretation of the Quran and Sharia. The clerical class — specifically the Grand Jurist — is God’s representative on earth, and the state must be governed under his guardianship.

What “Republic” Means in Practice

The “Republic” component asserts popular sovereignty. There will be elections. Citizens will vote for a president and parliament. The people exercise power through democratic institutions.

These two ideas are not simply different — they are structurally contradictory. Who is the ultimate source of authority: God (interpreted by clerics) or the people (expressed through elections)?

Iran’s first two Supreme Leaders — Khomeini and Khamenei — managed this contradiction masterfully. The question today is whether it can still be managed as Iran faces existential military and economic pressure.

3. Key Institutions: Who Does What?

Iran’s political system has several overlapping institutions. Here is how they fit together:

The Supreme Leader (Rahbar)

The apex of all authority. The Supreme Leader commands the armed forces, appoints key judicial and media figures, and has veto power over all major state decisions. He is appointed by the Assembly of Experts — a body of 88 Islamic scholars elected by the public. However, the Guardian Council must approve who can stand for election to the Assembly of Experts — meaning the Supreme Leader indirectly controls his own appointing body.

The Guardian Council

Twelve members total: six appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, and six nominated by the Chief Justice — who is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council has two devastating powers:

• It can disqualify any candidate from running in elections
• It can veto any bill passed by Parliament as un-Islamic or anti-revolutionary

The Parliament (Majlis)

A 290-seat elected body. Members can question the president, debate foreign policy, and pass legislation. However, any bill the Guardian Council dislikes is vetoed. The Majlis is a real democratic institution — but one operating inside a cage of clerical oversight.

The Expediency Council

When Parliament and the Guardian Council deadlock, the Expediency Council mediates. Its members are appointed by — yes — the Supreme Leader.

The President

Elected by popular vote. Heads the executive branch. Manages the economy, conducts diplomacy, and forms the cabinet. Has real but limited power. Cannot go against the core ideology of the revolution without facing marginalization — or removal. For more context on Iran’s executive structure, the
BBC’s guide to Iran’s political structure offers a useful overview.

4. Wilayat-e-Faqi: The Doctrine That Runs Everything

To understand Iran’s political identity after 1979, you must understand one term: Wilayat-e-Faqi (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist).

Rooted in Twelver Shia Islam, this doctrine holds that the Twelfth Imam — who is believed to be in occultation (hidden) — will return at the end of times. Until he arrives, the Islamic state must be governed under the guardianship of qualified Islamic jurists. The Grand Jurist (the Supreme Leader) is considered, in a theological sense, God’s representative on earth.

This doctrine transformed Iran’s identity entirely — from the secular, Western-aligned monarchy of Shah Reza Pahlavi to an ideologically revolutionary Shia state. It is not merely a constitutional principle; it is the soul of the regime. Any political actor who publicly contests Wilayat-e-Faqi cannot survive within Iran’s political system. Even reformists and pragmatists must operate within its framework.

“No pragmatist is against the Wilayat-e-Faqi system — at least not those in important positions. Because if he turns against it, how does he even belong in the system?”

For academic background on this doctrine, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a useful entry on
Islamic political philosophy and jurisprudence.

5. The IRGC: Iran’s Ideological Army

Most people know the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a military force. That is only part of the story.

How Iran’s Armed Forces Are Structured

There are essentially four layers of armed force in Iran:

• Artesh (38th Army) — The regular military, which existed since the Shah era. Some argue it was never fully trusted by the post-1979 leadership.
• IRGC — The elite revolutionary force, created specifically to protect the 1979 Revolution and its ideology.
• Basij — A paramilitary volunteer force with village-level reach. Used for social control, suppressing domestic dissent, and maintaining ideological compliance at the grassroots.
• Faraja (Police) — The regular law enforcement body.

The IRGC’s Unique Mandate

The IRGC is not a conventional army. It is an ideological body. Its founding purpose was not to defend Iran’s borders — it was to defend the Islamic Revolution itself. This distinction matters enormously when understanding why the IRGC behaves the way it does.

Within the IRGC, the Quds Force handles external operations: creating, training, funding, and supplying weapons to proxy groups across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah), Gaza, and Yemen. These are not merely strategic assets — they are extensions of Iran’s revolutionary ideology, designed to push resistance against Israel and American influence beyond Iran’s own borders.

The IRGC’s Economic Empire

Beyond military matters, the IRGC controls a vast network of companies and construction enterprises. Because foreign investment is restricted by sanctions, IRGC-affiliated companies fill the vacuum, controlling major infrastructure and supply chains inside Iran. This gives the IRGC independent economic power — separate from its parliamentary budget — making it structurally autonomous from civilian oversight.

The Wilson Center’s analysis of the IRGC’s political and economic role is one of the most thorough available to English-speaking readers.

6. Three Factions, Three Visions for Iran

Iran is not a monolith. Within the framework of the Islamic Republic, three major factions are currently competing — and their conflict has rarely been as visible as it is today.

Faction 1: The Maximalists (IRGC + Hardline Clerics)

The maximalist faction — represented strongly by the IRGC and certain members of the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts — believes Iran should make no concessions. Their position:

• No limits on nuclear enrichment or weapons development
• Iran can survive and win a war of attrition
• Iran’s proxy network must not be dismantled
• Ideological identity takes precedence over economic recovery

Their historical memory is shaped by what happened to Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi — both of whom gave up weapons of mass destruction under Western pressure, and both of whom were ultimately destroyed. To the IRGC, nuclear capability is the only true deterrent.

Faction 2: The Pragmatists (Civilian Government)

The current president and foreign minister represent the pragmatist wing. They have signaled openness to negotiations and a “moderate resolution.” Their argument is practical:

• Iran’s economy is under severe strain from sanctions and war costs
• Iran currently has rare leverage it should use wisely, not waste
• Even past Supreme Leaders accepted limits — Khomeini signed a ceasefire with Iraq in 1988 (calling it “drinking poison”), and Khamenei signed the JCPOA in 2015
• Ideology must not come at the cost of national survival

Faction 3: The Parliamentary Centrists

Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baghir Qalibaf represents a third center of gravity — between the hardliners and the pragmatists. He has attempted to play a diplomatic role, including in negotiations with Pakistan. However, it is reported that the IRGC has actively pressured to sideline him from negotiations, preferring the foreign minister’s more manageable track over an independently powerful parliamentary figure.

“He publicly labeled Jalili and ‘extremist militia-like actors’ who would destroy Iran — saying that people working in alignment with the IRGC will bring ruin.”

7. The Nuclear Question: Where All Factions Clash

The nuclear issue is not merely a military question in Iran. It is an ideological, economic, and existential one — which is why it has become the sharpest fault line between factions.

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 nations (the five UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany). Iran agreed to cap nuclear enrichment and accept international inspections in exchange for gradual sanctions relief. Crucially, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself backed the agreement.

In 2018, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, declaring it insufficient. Iran, arguing it had fulfilled its obligations, began incrementally exceeding enrichment limits. By 2025, Iran’s nuclear program has advanced significantly — closer to weapons-grade enrichment than at any prior point.

The IRGC’s position is unequivocal: nuclear capability is non-negotiable. Their logic — reinforced by the fates of Saddam and Gaddafi — is that surrendering nuclear leverage is surrendering the ultimate insurance policy against Western military action. For the civilian government and pragmatist faction, the JCPOA precedent matters: if the Supreme Leader could accept caps in 2015, a new agreement is ideologically defensible.

For an authoritative timeline of the JCPOA and its collapse, the
Arms Control Association’s JCPOA fact sheet is the most comprehensive public resource available.

8. The Supreme Leader’s Balancing Act

For over three decades, Iran’s Supreme Leaders have been the ultimate arbiters of factional conflict. Understanding how they maintained that authority illuminates the current crisis.

When Khamenei first assumed the Supreme Leadership after Khomeini’s death in 1989, he faced a legitimacy problem. He had not attained the highest clerical rank (Grand Ayatollah) that the constitution originally required. Rival clerics questioned his authority.

His strategy was methodical. He expanded the IRGC’s budget, strengthened its economic and political profile, and ensured the Guardian Council filtered political candidates toward those loyal to his vision. He placed his people in key institutions across all three branches — not through crude coercion, but through the patient accumulation of institutional control.

By managing the factions — allowing reformists enough space to release public pressure, while ensuring hardliners could veto anything fundamentally threatening — he maintained a dynamic equilibrium for decades. Reformist presidents like Khatami and Rouhani were permitted to operate, but any legislation that threatened the revolutionary core was vetoed by the Guardian Council. The reformists provided democratic legitimacy; the Guardian Council ensured ideological control.

“The previous Supreme Leader wanted the idea of a republic to be maintained — so that even dissenting voices could come to Parliament and feel heard. But ultimate control always remained with the clerics.”

The current challenge is that this equilibrium is visibly fracturing. The IRGC’s maximalism and the pragmatists’ urgency are now publicly at odds in a way that is harder to paper over.

Hegel, the German philosopher, argued that war serves a unifying function — it exposes inefficiencies, concentrates national purpose, and purifies the social body. The IRGC has internalized a version of this view. For them, war is not merely a strategic reality; it is an identity-confirming act. Permanent resistance against Israel and the United States is not a policy choice — it is what the revolution is.

For historical context on Iran’s revolutionary ideology and its evolution, the
Britannica overview of the Iranian Revolution and
Foreign Policy’s Iran coverage offer essential grounding.

9. Conclusion: What Comes Next?

Iran’s political system is not broken — it is working exactly as it was designed. Multiple power centers. Deliberate ambiguity about ultimate authority. An ideological core that limits how far any faction can deviate.

What is different now is the pressure. External military pressure from Israel and the United States. Internal economic deterioration. A nuclear program that has advanced to the point where decisions can no longer be deferred. And a factional conflict that, for the first time, is playing out visibly in public statements and media silences rather than behind closed doors.

The pragmatists argue that the window for a viable deal — one that lifts sanctions while preserving regime security — will not remain open indefinitely. The maximalists argue that any deal is capitulation, and that Iran’s revolutionary identity demands resistance above survival.

The Supreme Leader will ultimately decide. But the Supreme Leader’s power, as we have seen, is not unconditional. It depends on managing factions, not overriding them. And the faction with the most institutional power, the most economic independence, and the deepest ideological commitment — is the IRGC.

To follow Iran’s diplomatic negotiations in real time, the
IAEA’s Iran monitoring page provides official updates on nuclear compliance and inspections.