Pakistan Israel Relations

Pakistan Israel Relations History: The Origins of Hostility

The roots of this tension predate the existence of both nations. Even before India’s partition, Muhammad Ali Jinnah made his position on Palestine unmistakably clear. In October 1945, he declared that the Muslim world would rather perish than accept Jewish control over Jerusalem. This statement set the ideological tone for what would become the foundation of Pakistan Israel relations for decades to come.

When Israel declared independence in May 1948, its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion personally sent a telegram to Jinnah attempting to open diplomatic channels. Following the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948, David Ben-Gurion attempted to contact Muhammad Ali Jinnah via a telegram to establish diplomatic ties, but received no particular response. This silence effectively set the template for the next seven decades of Pakistan Israel relations — repeated Israeli outreach, met largely with Pakistani indifference or rejection. For a detailed account of this early period in Pakistan Israel relations history, see Wikipedia’s overview of Israel-Pakistan relations.

Example: It is similar to one country extending a handshake at a diplomatic event, only to have the other party turn around and walk away without a word — a pattern that has essentially repeated itself again and again since 1948.

Military Conflict in Pakistan Israel Relations History (1948–1982)

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, intelligence reports suggested Pakistan was exploring ways to militarily support the Arab side. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel’s diplomatic mission in Washington received information that Pakistan was trying to provide military assistance to the Palestinians alongside rumours that a Pakistani military battalion would be sent to Palestine to fight the Israelis. Pakistan had apparently bought 250,000 rifles in Czechoslovakia that were meant for the Arabs, and a later discovery revealed that Pakistan had bought three military-grade aircraft in Italy for the Egyptians. Whether these arms actually reached the battlefield remains historically unverified.

What is documented, however, is direct Pakistani military participation in later conflicts. Pakistani Air Force pilots flew missions against Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and again in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, marking the first instances of open Pakistani military support for the Palestinian and Arab cause. Pakistan was the only country, besides Iraq and the United Kingdom, that recognized the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. A Pakistani pilot even shot down an Israeli aircraft using a Syrian fighter jet in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967.

By 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, Pakistani volunteers had joined the PLO’s resistance, and around fifty Pakistanis were reportedly taken prisoner during the fighting. By this point, Israeli strategic planners viewed Pakistan as a committed adversary of the Jewish state, even without direct border conflict — a defining moment in Pakistan Israel relations history that hardened positions on both sides.

The Nuclear Question: A Tense Chapter in Pakistan Israel Relations

This is where the story takes a darker, more speculative turn. Israel has a documented history of pre-emptively striking the nuclear facilities of hostile states. It destroyed Iraq’s Tammuz reactor in 1981 and Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in 2007. Naturally, the question arises: why was Pakistan’s nuclear program never targeted in the same way, despite Pakistan being an avowed Islamic Republic that refuses to recognize Israel?

According to claims made in journalistic accounts of South Asian nuclear proliferation, Israel reportedly approached India in the 1980s with a proposal to jointly strike Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before they became operational. India is said to have declined the offer, and no further joint action was pursued. Neither the Indian nor the Israeli government has ever officially confirmed this claim, and it remains documented primarily through investigative books and journalist accounts rather than official government records.

Example: Imagine a chess player who has the option to eliminate an opponent’s most powerful piece early in the game but chooses restraint instead, calculating that triggering the move could destabilize the entire board far more than leaving the piece on it.

Musharraf’s Push to Normalize Pakistan Israel Relations

The most significant attempt at thawing Pakistan Israel relations came under President Pervez Musharraf in the early 2000s. Musharraf believed Pakistan’s economic and strategic future depended on closer alignment with the West, and that meant engaging Israel directly. In 2003, he stressed the need for better relations with Israel during his visit to Camp David.

This culminated in a historic public meeting. Shalom hailed the talks as having a “tremendous significance” in regards to not only Israel’s relations with Pakistan, but with the Muslim world. Describing it as a “historic meeting”, he was optimistic about establishing a “full diplomatic relationship with Pakistan as we would like it with all Muslim and Arab countries.” However, Musharraf clarified afterward that Pakistan would not formally recognize Israel until an independent Palestinian state was established. Despite the symbolic handshake between Musharraf and Israeli PM Ariel Sharon at the UN later that year, no formal diplomatic breakthrough followed, and domestic backlash in Pakistan ensured the initiative stalled. Dawn.com’s retrospective on this episode offers further detail on how the talks unfolded and why they ultimately failed.

Intelligence Sharing: The Covert Side of Pakistan Israel Relations

One of the most striking examples of behind-the-scenes cooperation came via leaked diplomatic cables. According to unconfirmed “leaked” American diplomatic cables, the head of Pakistan’s ISI, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha passed on intelligence of the discovery of potential terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India to Israel through Washington. This warning preceded the devastating 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, which targeted multiple sites including a Jewish community center, ultimately validating the intelligence that had been shared.

This episode illustrates a recurring theme: Pakistan’s official rhetoric against Israel exists on a completely separate track from the quiet, pragmatic security cooperation maintained by its military and intelligence establishment. A complicated and often contradictory relationship exists between the Pakistani military and Israel, marked by behind-the-scenes cooperation despite public hostility and a lack of formal diplomatic relations. Salaamedia’s investigation into these covert ties documents several other such instances across the decades.

The Abraham Accords and Pakistan Israel Relations Under Imran Khan

When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020 under the Trump administration, normalizing relations between Israel and several Arab states, speculation grew that Pakistan would be pressured to follow suit. There was again some momentum within Pakistan to normalize ties with Israel on the heels of the Abraham Accords in 2020, after the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed normalization agreements with Israel.

Then-Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly stated that he had rejected American pressure to bring Pakistan into the Accords. He also separately accused his own close aide, Zulfi Bukhari, of secretly traveling to Israel to meet Mossad chief Yossi Cohen — a claim Bukhari denied. This controversy reflects how toxic the very idea of engagement with Israel remains within Pakistani domestic politics, even at the highest levels of government. The Middle East Institute’s analysis goes deeper into how the Abraham Accords reshaped this internal Pakistani debate.

Asim Munir and the Latest Twist in Pakistan Israel Relations

The most recent chapter in Pakistan Israel relations history involves Pakistan’s current army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who has emerged as a key mediator between the United States, Iran, and Israel following recent regional tensions. His diplomatic prominence has reportedly earned him direct praise from President Trump and frequent contact with senior American officials.

Amid this rising profile, Brazilian journalist Pepe Escobar made a startling claim on a podcast: that Mossad, under orders from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, had allegedly planned an attack targeting Munir during a Pakistan-Iran delegation visit to Switzerland. According to this claim, Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency reportedly learned of the plot and relayed a warning through Oman that any harm to the delegation would result in retaliation against Israel.

It is important to note that this claim has been denied by the Pakistani government, has received no official confirmation or denial from Israel, and originates from a journalist with a documented history of reporting for Russia Today, Al Jazeera, and Sputnik — outlets generally associated with anti-Western and multipolar-world editorial positions. As of now, this remains an unverified claim rather than confirmed fact, and readers should treat it with appropriate skepticism.

Why Pakistan Israel Relations Have Never Escalated to War

Despite seven decades of hostile rhetoric, neither country has ever launched a direct military strike against the other. There are several concrete strategic reasons why Pakistan Israel relations have remained tense but bloodless:

1. Geographic Distance and Lack of Military Infrastructure

Unlike Iran, which Israel can strike using regional military bases and allied airspace, Israel has no comparable launch infrastructure anywhere near Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan possesses no military bases in the Middle East from which it could realistically strike Israel.

2. Nuclear Deterrence

Both nations possess nuclear weapons. Any direct military confrontation carries the catastrophic risk of nuclear escalation, a risk neither side is willing to accept for a conflict that, until now, has remained primarily rhetorical.

3. Absence of Direct Strategic Threat

As Netanyahu himself stated during a 2017 visit to India: “We [Israel] are not an enemy of Pakistan and Pakistan should not be our enemy either.” This reflects a long-standing, mutually understood status quo — both sides issue strong statements for domestic and religious audiences, but neither perceives an active existential threat from the other.

4. Economic Constraints

Sustained warfare requires massive financial backing. Pakistan’s economy has been under continuous strain, and Israel’s recent military campaigns have been heavily subsidized by American financial and military support — support that would not extend to a war against Pakistan, a nation with no direct conflict of interest with the United States.

Example: It is much like two countries playing a long, drawn-out game of diplomatic chicken — both sides rev their engines and make threatening noises, but neither one is willing to actually crash the car.

Domestic Politics: The Pakistani Constraint on Pakistan Israel Relations

One of the biggest obstacles to any future normalization in Pakistan Israel relations is not geopolitical — it is domestic. Pakistani society remains deeply influenced by religious sentiment regarding the Palestinian cause, often viewing it through the lens of Jerusalem’s religious significance rather than pure geopolitics. One still sees the explicit phrase “This passport is valid for all countries of the world except Israel” written quite unapologetically on the Pakistani passport.

Hardline religious-political organizations like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) have shown they can mobilize massive street protests at a moment’s notice whenever the Israel-Palestine issue surfaces in national discourse — far larger, in fact, than protests over domestic issues like inflation or unemployment. This makes any visible diplomatic outreach toward Israel politically dangerous for Pakistani leadership, regardless of what quiet cooperation may exist at the military or intelligence level.

Conclusion: A Permanent Cold Stalemate

The Pakistan Israel relations history is best understood not as a story of open conflict, but as a decades-long cold stalemate — public hostility paired with quiet, pragmatic cooperation whenever strategic interests align. From Jinnah’s early rejection of Ben-Gurion’s outreach to today’s unverified claims about Mossad and Asim Munir, the pattern remains remarkably consistent: loud rhetoric, careful restraint, and an unspoken mutual understanding that neither side benefits from actual war.

Whether the current geopolitical alignment — with Munir positioned as a key broker between Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf — eventually pushes Pakistan toward the Abraham Accords, or whether domestic religious sentiment continues to block any formal recognition of Israel, remains one of the most closely watched open questions in South Asian and Middle Eastern diplomacy. For ongoing strategic analysis on this question, the Institute for National Security Studies’ assessment is a useful resource.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1. Does Pakistan officially recognize Israel?

No. Pakistan has never officially recognized the State of Israel. Pakistani passports explicitly state they are not valid for travel to Israel, and successive governments have maintained that recognition will only be considered once an independent Palestinian state is established.

Q2. Has Pakistan ever fought a war against Israel?

Pakistan has never fought a direct, official war against Israel. However, Pakistani Air Force pilots did fly combat missions against Israel during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars in support of Arab and Palestinian forces.

Q3. Is it true that Mossad planned to assassinate Asim Munir?

This claim originates from a single Brazilian journalist, Pepe Escobar, and has not been verified or confirmed by any government, including Pakistan’s, Israel’s, or Iran’s. It should be treated as an unverified claim rather than an established fact.

Q4. Why hasn’t Israel attacked Pakistan’s nuclear facilities like it did in Iraq and Syria?

Within Pakistan Israel relations history, this restraint is primarily due to geographic distance, lack of nearby military infrastructure, the absence of a direct strategic threat from Pakistan toward Israel, and the heightened risk of nuclear escalation given Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state.

Q5. Do Pakistan and Israel have any secret cooperation despite no formal relations?

Yes. Within Pakistan Israel relations, multiple leaked diplomatic cables and journalistic investigations have revealed instances of intelligence-sharing between Pakistan’s ISI and Israel’s Mossad, including a notable warning passed ahead of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.

Q6. Could Pakistan join the Abraham Accords in the future?

It remains a possibility discussed in policy circles, especially given Pakistan’s growing alignment with the United States. However, strong domestic religious and political opposition makes any near-term formal normalization unlikely.

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